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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATING NUDE DANCING IN LIQUOR ESTABLISHMENTS-THE PREFERRED
POSITION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT-Na/l
v. Baca.

INTRODUCTION
In Nail v. Baca' the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a statute which prohibits nude dancing in a licensed
liquor establishment abridges the constitutional right of free
speech. 2 The court held that the statute was constitutional. The court
3
limited its result to the specific facts presented in the case. The
statute in question prohibited both nude dancing in liquor establishments and nude dancing in public places.' The court refused to
determine the potential overbreadth of a statute which prohibits
nude dancing in public places. 5 The opinion in Nail v. Baca applies
only to the prohibition of nude dancing in liquor establishments. Because the court limited its result, any discussion of nude dancing in
6
public places would be speculative and advisory in nature.
The court analyzed the case not in terms of the first amendment,
but in terms of a state's power to regulate the sale and distribution of
alcohol pursuant to the twenty-first amendment of the federal constitution. Because the court was, as it stated, 7 also confronted with a
first amendment issue, such reasoning was incomplete and left the
issue open to further litigation.
It is possible that other constitutional challenges will be made to
New Mexico's indecent dancing statute. Other New Mexico liquor
1. 95 N.M. 783, 626 P.2d 1280 (1980).
2. The New Mexico Supreme Court framed the issue as: "Does the prohibition of nude
dancing in a licensed liquor establishment by Section 30-9-14.1 violate N.M. Const., Art. 2,
Section 17 [free speech]?" 95 N.M. at 786, 626 P.2d at 1283.
3. 95 N.M. at 788, 626 P.2d at 1285.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-9-14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980). The applicable text of this provision
reads: "Indecent dancing consists of a person knowingly and intentionally exposing his intimate parts to public view while dancing or performing for compensation in a licensed liquor
establishment or public place . .. Whoever commits indecent dancing is guilty of a petty misdemeanor . . . A liquor licensee or his agent who allows indecent dancing on the licensed
premises is guilty of a petty misdemeanor and his license may be suspended or revoked pursuant to the provisions of the Liquor Control Act."
5. 95 N.M. at 788, 626 P.2d at 1285.
6. The New Mexico State Legislature deleted the prohibition of nude dancing in public
places from the indecent dancing statute in 1981. N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-9-14.1 (Cum. Supp.
1981).
7. See note 2, supra.
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licensees who wish to offer nude dancing performances in their establishments may challenge the prohibition of such entertainment by
raising first and fourteenth amendment arguments.' Should the New
Mexico Supreme Court again be asked to rule on the constitutionality of the statute which prohibits nude dancing in liquor establishments, a more complete and informative analysis would include the
determination of the constitutional status, if any, of nude dancing,
and a delicate and thorough balancing of conflicting constitutional

interests.
This Note provides an overview of the case law arising under the
twenty-first amendment in light of the issues addressed in Nail v.
Baca. The specific question of whether the twenty-first amendment
should be employed to prohibit operators of liquor establishments
from presenting non-obscene nude dancing performances will also
be addressed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lancett Nail, plaintiff-appellant, owned a dispenser's license and
operated a liquor establishment. Nude dancing had been presented
on the premises since 1970. On August 3, 1979, Jim Baca, the Director of Alcohol Beverage Control of the State of New Mexico, 9 ordered his agents to cite Nall for violating the state's indecent dancing
statute. II
Nail and Maria Dyer, one of the dancers he employed, filed suit
8. The plaintiffs could demand that the court establish firmly whether nude dancing is constitutionally protected under the first amendment. Equal protection, as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution could also be argued. For example, the statute
could be overbroad because it applies to those whose nude dancing does not cause violence or
immoral behavior. Thus, the statute may create a class whose activities are forbidden without a
rational relationship to the legitimate state interest.
The court in Nail did not decide, but only mentioned, the issue of the overbreadth of the
"public place" part of the statute. The overbreadth of a statute which prohibits nude dancing
in bars and in public places was discussed in one of the very cases cited in Nail v. Baca. In
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the United States Supreme Court said that a
statute which prohibited nude dancing in liquor establishments and public places could be unconstitutionally overbroad. No actual decision on the overbreadth was offered by the Supreme
Court, because it was only considering the validity of an injunction against the enforcement of
the statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court in Nail v. Baca stated that the potential overbreadth of the indecent dancing statute was not an important consideration, because the
statute could be severed to include only the prohibition of nude dancing in liquor establishments. 95 N.M. at 788, 626 P.2d at 1285.
The statute could also be challenged as underinclusive, because it does not apply to those
"fully-clothed" dancers whose suggestive dancing may cause violent or immoral behavior.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-4B-2(A)(I) (Cum. Supp. 1981), describes the liquor director's
duties: "The director is responsible for the operation of the department. It is his duty to supervise all operations of the department and to: (1) administer and enforce the laws the administration of which the department is charged."
10. 95 N.M. at 784, 626 P.2d at 1281.
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for a declaratory judgment holding the statute unconstitutional and
for an injunction against enforcement of the statute. The plaintiffs
claimed that the statute deprived the dancers of their right to free
speech. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' requested relief, holding
that New Mexico's indecent dancing statute did not violate any constitutional guarantee to free speech.II Plaintiffs appealed and the
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision.' 2
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Originally, Nall and Dyer had asked the trial court to adopt the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: (a) nude dancing
had become an accepted art form by the local community; (b) nude
dancing was an historical, as well as a recent form of expression for
the dancer as well as her audience; and (c) there was no evidence to
show that the nude dancing in Nall's establishment was obscene. I3
Nall and Dyer had hoped to establish with those findings that Dyer's
nude dancing was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments
to the federal constitution and by the "liberty of speech" provision
of the New Mexico Constitution.'" The trial court refused to adopt
these findings on the ground that the findings were immaterial and
irrelevant to the determination of the constitutionality of the New
Mexico indecent dancing statute.' 5
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court offered three lines of
reasoning for holding the statute constitutional: (a) the twenty-first
amendment gives a state broad powers in the area of state liquor
regulations;'" (b) any first amendment interest in nude dancing in liquor establishments is outweighed by the state's interest in regulating alcohol; ' and, (c) even if nude dancing is constitutionally protected in liquor establishments, the dancing, itself, has never been
the subject of the regulation.',
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 785, 626 P.2d at 1282.
14. The federal provision states that, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
" U.S. Const. amend. I. The state provision says, "no law shall be
freedom of speech ..
"N.M. Const. art 2, § 17.
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech.
15. 95 N.M. at 785, 626 P.2d at 1282.
16. Id. at 786-87, 626 P.2d at 1283-84.
17. Id. at 787, 626 P.2d at 1284.
18. Id. In this somewhat vague line of reasoning, the court suggested that the subject of
regulation had always been alcohol. There is a question why, if the purpose of the statute is to
regulate the sale of alcohol, N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-9-14.1 (Supp. 1980) is a criminal statute, and
is not part of the New Mexico Liquor Control Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §60-3A-1 (Repl. 1981).
Furthermore, even if the court regarded the indecent dancing statute as a regulation of alcohol,
the practical effect is the prohibition of nude dancing. Liquor licensees will always stop nude
dancing performances before they risk having their licenses revoked.
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In Nail, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not actually decide
the threshhold issue of whether nude dancing is protected by the first
amendment. The court focused its attention only on the twenty-first
amendment. With that analysis, the court failed to provide lower
courts or practitioners with guidance as to whether nude dancing is a
protected form of expression under the first amendment. Should the
question again arise, a more informative analysis would address the
following issues. First, the court should decide whether nude dancing is a type of speech or speech-related conduct. Second, the court
should consider whether nude dancing is a protected form of expression. Finally, if nude dancing is protected, the court should balance
the state's interest in regulating alcohol against an individual's interest in free speech as expressed through nude dancing. 9
A. Nude Dancingand the FirstAmendment
The issue of whether nude dancing is protected by the first amendment has never been resolved by either the United States Supreme
Court or the New Mexico Supreme Court. In a recent United States
Supreme Court decision, New York State Liquor Authority v.
Bellanca,20 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, noted:
Although the Court has written several opinions implying that
nude or partially nude dancing is a form of expressive activity
protected by the First Amendment, the Court has never directly
confronted the question. 2 '
Nude dancing, under appropriate circumstances, may be a protected form of expression.22 For example, an actor, as part of a
theatrical production, is entitled to constitutional protection.23
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has maintained that pro19. By ignoring the potential first amendment status of nude dancing, the New Mexico
Supreme Court may have implied that such a concern was frivolous. Admittedly, nude dancing
may not be important enough to outweigh the interests underlying a state's power to regulate
alcohol. Legitimate allegations of a first amendment violation should, however, be taken seriously and should be resolved in an appropriate manner. Thus, if prohibiting nude dancing in a
liquor establishment was more important than Nail's and Dyer's first amendment interests in
nude dancing, the court should have explained why this was so.
20. 49U.S.L.W. 3950(June22, 1981).
21. Id. at 3951 (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion).
22. The United States Supreme Court said in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975),
"Although the customary 'bar room' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)
. . . that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment
protection under some circumstances." 422 U.S. at 932.
23. The United States Supreme Court, in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) said,
"An actor, like everyone else in our country, enjoys a constitutional right to freedom of
speech.
... Id. at 63.
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tected speech may include forms of expression which entertain.2"
Dancing as entertainment or theatrics, therefore, should have the
same sort of protection as other forms of theatre or entertainment.
Even if nude dancing cannot be labeled pure speech,2" the dancing
should not automatically be excluded from the protective parameters
of the first amendment, and should receive a full first amendment
analysis. Speech-related conduct is also protected by the first amendment. In United States v. O'Brien2 6 the United States Supreme Court
decided that when the government attempts to suppress speechrelated conduct, the government must show that the regulation advances a substantial government interest when it regulates the conduct.2" A government interest is justified if "it furthers an important
or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.""
If the nude dancing in an establishment such as Nall's is characterized as speech or speech-related conduct, then an important, substantial interest must be demonstrated to allow a prohibition of such
conduct. The New Mexico Supreme Court, in Nail v. Baca, said that
nude dancing, even if protected by the first amendment, was not the
subject of regulation. The court thus implied that N.M. Stat. Ann.
§30-9-14.1 (Supp. 1980) was regulating the sale of alcohol and not
regulating nude dancing. 9 It is irrelevant whether the State of New
Mexico and the New Mexico courts characterize the statute as regulating alcohol or nude dancing. Section 30-9-14.1 forbids nude dancing in liquor establishments. 3" The practical effect of the statute,
therefore, can also be the censorship of speech or speech-related conduct in liquor establishments. 3 ' As a result, the State of New Mexico,
under the O'Brien decision, should be required to demonstrate
24. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). In Winters, the United States Supreme Court
said that a distinction between speech which entertains and speech which informs is too vague
to form the basis for prohibiting expression. At issue in the Winters case was a statute which
prohibited the distribution of magazines that contained news and stories of violence, bloodshed, and crime. The local government felt that such material would incite violence.
25. The distinction between speech and conduct has never truly been helpful in analyzing
first amendment issues. "The trouble with the distinction between speech and conduct is that it
has real content. Expression and conduct, message and medium, are . . . inextricably tied toL. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978).
gether in all communicative behavior.
26. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
27. Id. at 376-77.
28. Id. at 377.
29. 95 N.M. at 787, 626 P.2d at 1284.
30. See note 4, supra.
31. See note 18, supra.
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of alcohol. No
significant governmental interests in the regulation
32
such interest was ever presented in Nail v. Baca.
If the speech or speech-related conduct is obscene, it cannot receive any first amendment protection at all. A showing of obscenity
makes the activity a valid subject of state regulation.3 3 The United
States Supreme Court said that obscenity is "no essential part of any
exposition of ideas and . . . of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 34 If nude dancing were afforded first amendment protection, that protection would
be withdrawn if the dancing were found to be obscene. That, however, is an issue to be determined by the fact-finder.
Once the distinction between protected expression and obscenity is
established, the next logical step is the difficult chore of creating a
definitional test for obscenity. As the United States pointed out in
Miller v. California,3" "no majority of the Court at any given time
has been able to agree on a standard to determine what constitutes
"..
36 The current test for obobscene pornographic material .
scenity apparently requires the fact-finder to conclude that: (a) the
average person applying contemporary community standards would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest; (b)
the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and, (c) the
work taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 37 States remain free to adopt their own standards of
Court may object, however,
prurience. 38 The United States Supreme
39
unreasonable.
are
which
standards
to
Given the fact that the dancing in Nall's establishment was not
proven obscene,"0 the dancing should not have been prohibited.
32. The opinion in Nail v. Baca says, "Baca offered no evidence to show that nude dancing
performed at the Lancer's Club injured, harmed or threatened the public health, safety and
morals." 95 N.M. at 783, 626 P.2d at 1281.
33. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
34. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1941). Chaplinsky involved the
use of derisive language in public which allegedly was likely to cause a breach of the public
peace and order.
35. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 24.
38. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 662-63 (1978).
39. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the United States Supreme
Court found that no jury could reasonably conclude that the film, "Carnal Knowledge" was
obscene- The Court said that juries do not have unlimited discretion in determining what constitutes obscene material. In Jenkins, the Supreme Court viewed the movie and noted that
although there was nudity, the scenes did not depict or describe "patently offensive hard core
sexual conduct." Id. at 160. As such, the movie was not obscene.
40. 95 N.M. at 784, 626 P.2d at 1281.
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Without a showing of obscenity, nude dancing may fall into the category of speech or speech-related conduct which is protected by the
first amendment, absent a justifiable state reason to prohibit such
conduct. The court should decide whether nude dancing is protected
by the first amendment. If it is, the individual's protected interests
must then be balanced against the state interest under the twentyfirst amendment."'

B. The FirstAmendment vs. The Twenty-first Amendment
It is reasonable to assume that the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Nall v. Baca was confronted with a valid first amendment argument.
Thus, Nail v. Baca clearly presented the court with the problem of
dealing with two separate and competing constitutional provisions.
Plaintiff-appellants argued that nude dancing was protected by the
first amendment, while the State of New Mexico argued that the
twenty-first amendment allowed the prohibition of such conduct in
liquor establishments. 2
The method of analyzing and resolving conflicting constitutional
provisions was discussed by the United States Supreme Court in
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor."3 The issue addressed in Hostetter was
whether the twenty-first amendment completely superseded the
commerce clause 4 of the federal constitution. The United States
Supreme Court in Hostetter specifically stated that in analyzing
competing sections of the constitution, "each must be considered in
light of the other, and in the context of the issues and interests at
stake in any concrete case." 4 ' The Court examined the underlying interests of each constitutional provision and concluded that the
twenty-first amendment did not outweigh the stated purpose of the
commerce clause as presented in the case before them. 6
The New Mexico Supreme Court's analysis in Nail v. Baca did not
contain a similar balancing of the constitutional interests involved.
First, the court failed to determine whether nude dancing was a pro41. U.S. Const., amend. XXI, §2 provides: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
42. 95 N.M. at 783, 626 P.2d at 1280.
43. 377 U.S. 324(1964).
44. U.S. Const.; Art. 1, §8 provides: "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
45. 377 U.S. at 332. This case involved the transportation of liquor to consumers in foreign
countries. The commerce clause was allowed to supersede the state's interest in regulating
alcohol.
46. 377 U.S. at 333-34.
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tected form of expression under the first amendment."7 Because the
court did not determine whether any first amendment protections
were to be afforded to nude dancing, there was nothing to balance
against the twenty-first amendment. As a result, a balancing of competing constitutional provisions was not possible. Second, the court
upheld the New Mexico indecent dancing statute without a showing
that nude dancing caused any harm to the public." The state's interest in regulating alcohol was never presented. Should the issue again
arise, the court should first, as discussed above, decide whether nude
dancing in bars is a protected form of speech or speech-related conduct and is or is not obscene. Then the court should balance the interests involved in each amendment to decide which should prevail.
1. The first amendment
When balancing the interests involved, the New Mexico Supreme
Court should first evaluate the individual's potential first amendment interest in nude dancing in a bar. Great emphasis has traditionally been placed on protecting a person's first amendment rights.
The United States Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins"9 said that
the preferred place given to the first amendment in the overall
scheme of democratic freedoms "gives these liberties a sanctity and
• . . any attempt to restrict these liberties must be justified by clear
public interest . . ".30 The emphasis on first amendment rights has
led some people to believe that such first amendment rights are absolute.
A recurring debate in modern first amendment jurisprudence

has been whether first amendment rights are absolute in the
sense that government may not abridge them at all or whether
the first amendment requires balancing of competing interests.
'5

1

Such an absolutist viewpoint has never really prevailed, however.
For example, speech which incites violent or illegal conduct is not
47. 93 N.M. at 784, 626 P.2d at 1281. Instead, the New Mexico Supreme Court said that
even if nude dancing is protected, any first amendment interest is outweighed by the twentyfirst amendment. How one constitutional interest can outweigh another interest without a
determination that two constitutional interests exist is indeed difficult to comprehend.
48. 95 N.M. at 784, 626 P.2d at 1281. While the indecent dancing statute itself does not require a showing of harm in order for the dancing to be indecent, such a showing should be necessary if the state's interest in regulating alcohol is to be balanced against a first amendment
claim.
49. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Collins involved the appellant's alleged right to encourage workers
to join labor unions without first receiving permission from the government.
50. 323 U.S. at 529-30.
51. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 582 (1978).
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protected under the first amendment.52 Libelous speech is also unprotected.5 3 Obscene speech, as discussed earlier, is excluded from
the guarantees of the first amendment." These examples all involve
weighing the importance of the type of speech against the harms
caused by the speech.
In the case of nude dancing, the court should evaluate the right to
individual expression involved in nude dancing and consider the potential harms which might be caused by the conduct. Any further
discussion of the value of individual expression through nude dancing, for the purposes of this casenote, would be entirely speculative.
A court, presented with such an issue, would have to make the ultimate determination.
2. The twenty-first amendment
After identifying any potential first amendment interests in nude
dancing, the New Mexico Supreme Court should then proceed to
identify the state's interest in regulating such behavior in liquor
establishments. The New Mexico Supreme Court relied heavily on
the twenty-first amendment in justifying its decision in Nail v. Baca.
A brief history of the twenty-first amendment may help to explain
the court's reliance on that particular constitutional provision.
Control of the liquor industry has long been viewed as being well
within the scope of a state's traditional police powers.5" The adoption of the twenty-first amendment gave an added presumption of
validity to the state's power of alcohol control. Originally, application of this constitutional provision created conflicts with the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.5 6 More often than
not, the twenty-first amendment has been held to be more important
than typical commerce clause concerns, though some decisions did
uphold the necessity for the commerce clause over twenty-first
amendment concerns. In Ziffrin v. Reeves,57 for example, the United
States Supreme Court declared commerce clause concerns relatively
unimportant when the twenty-first amendment was involved. The
Ziffrin court emphasized a state's right under the twenty-first
amendment to enact legislation regulating the manufacture, trans52. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47(1919).
53. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
54. See text accompanying notes 29-33, supra.
55. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890). The Court noted that "[tihe police power of
the State is fully competent to regulate the [liquor] business-to mitigate its evils or to suppress
it entirely." Id. at 91.
56. See note 43, supra.
57. 308 U.S. 132 (1939).
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portation, sale, and distribution of intoxicating liquors. The court
said, "The twenty-first amendment sanctions the rights of a state to
legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without,
unfettered by the Commerce Clause."" In another case, Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter," the United States Supreme Court upheld a New
York policy regulating the sale of liquor. The policy required alcohol
prices to remain within certain price boundaries. The Court stated
that while the twenty-first amendment did not repeal the commerce
clause, the amendment did grant the states wide latitude in the area
60
of liquor control.
The twenty-first amendment is not, however, without limitations.
The United States Supreme Court has said that, "The operation of
the twenty-first amendment does not alter the application of equal
protection standards." 6 ' The United States Supreme Court has said,
too, that although the police power of the states over intoxicating liquors is extremely broad, procedural due process requires notice and
the opportunity to be heard.6 2 Thus, the twenty-first amendment
does not automatically supersede all other constitutional provisions
and it should be balanced, as in the case of Nail v. Baca, with any
first amendment concerns.
3. Balancing the constitutional interests
The status of the twenty-first amendment in relation to the first
amendment and nude dancing was first addressed in California v.
LaRue,63 a United States Supreme Court decision. The issue addressed in LaRue was essentially the same issue as that presented in
Nail v. Baca. The United States Supreme Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited nude dancing in bars." The Court said that the twenty-first amendment allowed a state to prohibit in liquor establishments certain types of
entertainment, including nude dancing. 65 In LaRue, the Court
58. Id. at 138.
59. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
60. Id. at 42.
61. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209 (1976). Craiginvolved a statute which forbade the sale
of 3.2% beer to females under the age of eighteen and to males under the age of twenty-one.
The Court held that such a regulation violated equal protection standards.
62. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971). The state attempted to prohibit the
sale of alcohol to "problem drinkers." The state issued lists of such people to liquor stores, informing the stores that they were not to sell liquor to the people whose name appeared on the
list. The Court held that such action, without judicial determination, denied a party's right to
due process.
63. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
64. Id. at 110.
65. Id. at 117.

Winter 1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

recognized that the twenty-first amendment gives a presumption of
validity to state regulations involving the sale of alcoholic beverages.
The Court said that some forms of expression could be constitutionally prohibited if the expression caused harm to the public. 6 In the
context of nude dancing, if such dancing in liquor establishments
caused members of the audience to react violently or immorally,
thereby causing harm to the surrounding community, such otherwise
protected expression could be prohibited.
The crucial difference between LaRue and Nail v. Baca involved
the nature of the evidence presented to the courts. In LaRue, the
United States Supreme Court expressly recognized and mentioned
the evidence collected by the California Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control which extensively documented injuries to the public caused by nude dancing. 67 The evidence included numerous incidents of valid concern to the Department. Aside from vulgar physical contact between the dancers and the customers, the Department
found that prostitution involving young girls had occurred, as well
as attempted rape, actual rape, and assaults on police officers, all examples of proscribed activity which were attributable to the effect of
nude dancing on the public."'
Even in its more recent decision involving the constitutionality of
nude dancing in liquor establishments, New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca,69 the Supreme Court appeared to be uneasy
about upholding a statute which prohibited topless dancing without
some showing of a state interest in regulating alcohol. The Bellanca
opinion, which upheld the state's prohibition of topless dancing,
clearly referred to a legislative memorandum issued by the New York
Legislature which discussed "the disturbances associated with mixing alcohol and nude dancing."0
Some jurisdictions have held that LaRue stands for the proposition that a statute regulating alcoholic beverages is to be presumed
constitutional, even absent any showing of harm to the public."'
Other jurisdictions, however, have held that LaRue is limited to its
facts, due to the vulgarity of the regulated activity and the graphic
social harms. For example, in Birkenshaw v. Haley72 the United
States District Court for the Eastern Division of Michigan said that
66. Id.
67. Id. at i1i.
68. Id.
69. 49 U.S.L.W. 3950 (June 22, 1981).
70. Id. at 3951.
71. E.g., Castlewood Int.I. Corp. v. Simon, 596 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1979); Blantik Co. v.
Ketola, 587 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1978); Paladino v. City of Omaha, 471 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1972).
72. 409 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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the regulations in LaRue were upheld because the regulations were
"particularly aimed at combating . . . social evils which had resulted from placing inebriated patrons in close proximity to nude or
4
semi-nude entertainers." 73 In Clark v. City of Fremont,Nebraska"
the court noted that LaRue involved evidence of problems associated
with explicit entertainment. In light of such evidence, the court said
that "the Supreme Court felt that the department's choice of a prophylactic solution to the problem was neither irrational nor unreasonable." 75
The decision in Nail v. Baca can only be explained if the New Mexico Supreme Court relied on the added presumption of validity of a
state regulation pursuant to the twenty-first amendment. 76 This presumption, however, does not begin to solve the problems presented
by the lack of any first amendment analysis or showing of public
harm, actual or potential, in Nail. It is possible that the court implicitly adopted the findings of the related activities which supported
the prohibition of nude dancing in LaRue. There was, however, no
indication that the Nall court adopted the California court's findings
of fact. The Nail v. Baca decision, in effect, seemed to presume that
any nude dancing in bars would be sufficiently likely to cause harm
to the public. Such a presumption by the court would have to be a
substitute for the state interest in regulating alcohol.
Without any first amendment analysis, the decision in Nail v.
73. Id. at 17. Birkenshaw involved the court's granting of an injunction against enforcement
of a statute prohibiting nude dancing in a liquor establishment. The court said that the injuncdon would remain in effect until the vagueness of the statute was resolved and until obscenity
was shown.
74. 377 F. Supp. 327 (D. Neb. 1974). The court held that a statute which prohibited nude
dancing in bars was unconstitutional to the extent that the opportunity for judicial review of
the nature of the dance was denied. Only if the nude dancing was shown to be obscene could
the state constitutionally prohibit the dancing.
75. Id.at 331.
76. The New Mexico Supreme Court cited a United States Supreme Court opinion, Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975), for the proposition that any first amendment interest in
nude dancing in liquor establishments was outweighed by the interests of a state in regulating
alcohol. 95 N.M. at 787, 626 P.2d at 1284. Doran can be distinguished from Nal v. Baca on
two grounds. First, the standard enunciated in Doran is not the same standard expressed by the
United States Supreme Court in its most recent decision involving the first amendment and
nude dancing. In New York Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, the United States Supreme Court
definitely weighed competing interests. See text accompanying notes 69-70, supra. Thus, even
if Doran supports Nail v. Baca, the standard of review in Doran is outdated. Second, Doran involved a request for a preliminary injunction. The Court only had to determine the likelihood
of success of the petitioners' claims. The Court never made any final decision on the merits of
the case. Whether the Court in Doran would have actually upheld a criminal statute prohibiting nude dancing, such as New Mexico's Indecent Dancing Statute, is difficult to say. The
Doran Court might have been more cautious in its decision if confronted with the knowledge
that its decision would carry more impact than that which accompanies the granting of a preliminary injunction.
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Baca effectively granted unlimited scope to the twenty-first amendment, as it relates to the exercise of free expression in liquor establishments in New Mexico. A chilling effect to free expression could
be one unfortunate result of the Nail v. Baca decision. 7 For example, a court could, by applying the holding in Nail v. Baca, determine that the twenty-first amendment gives added validity to a regulation prohibiting speech which is likely to cause harmful effects,
even if evidence of such an effect is absent. After Nall, a challenger
to the statute is likely to be required to defend his or her first amendment right to freedom of expression by overcoming a heavy presumption of validity afforded to such a statute by the twenty-first
amendment. Meanwhile, that challenger's potential first amendment
rights would be effectively denied. Such a burden of proof is not
justified. The United States Supreme Court in SoutheasternPromotions, Ltd. v. Conrad 8 said with regard to the first amendment and
prior restraint:
First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of
proving that the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor.
Second, any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed
only for a specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured."
The Court in Southeastern Promotionssaid that a city's prior restraint of free expression in the musical production, "Hair," was
unconstitutional, because the material was not proven to be unprotected.8 0 The court did not say that the production was not obscene. Instead, the court said that the city of Chattanooga had not
provided adequate procedural safeguards under which the first
amendment interests could be assessed.I'
Admittedly, SoutheasternPromotionsdid not involve a balancing
of the first and twenty-first amendments. The decision, however,
does show a reluctance on the part of the United States Supreme
Court to prohibit free expression on the basis of a likelihood of
harm, as opposed to an actual demonstration of injury.
77. The United States Supreme Court has held that a regulation can be challenged even if it
falls short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of first amendment rights. This proposition was upheld both in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), and in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). By requiring a plaintiff to overcome the presumption of the twentyfirst amendment before that plaintiff may exercise his freedom of expression, the New Mexico
Supreme Court indirectly places a burden on plaintiffs' first amendment rights.
78. 420 U.S. 546(1975).
79. Id. at 560.
80. Id.at 561-62.
81. Id. at 562.
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If the New Mexico Supreme Court had properly balanced the first
and twenty-first amendment interests presented in Nail v. Baca, the
state's interest in regulating alcohol might have outweighed the appellants' interests in free expression. Because the court did not
evaluate and balance these interests, however, the appellants lost
their right to free expression without any discernible justification.
CONCLUSION
Non-obscene nude dancing in New Mexico liquor establishments
may be entitled to protection under the first amendment. A substantial state interest should be demonstrated before such activity is prohibited. In Nall v. Baca, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld a
statute which prohibited such expression without any showing of a
substantial state interest. The court held that the twenty-first amendment was controlling, because the regulation of alcohol was a necessary part of state police powers. The court did not explain what
twenty-first amendment interests were being served. More important, the court did not determine what, if any, first amendment interests were being sacrificed. Prohibiting nude dancing in liquor
establishments without appropriate constitutional analysis will probably not destroy our federal constitutional right of free expression.
It could, however, provide a chilling effect on the freedom of expression in liquor establishments in New Mexico. If continued, the type
of constitutional analysis employed in Nail v. Baca could definitely
present a threat to our legitimate concern in free speech.
DANIEL E. RAMCZYK

